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Psychopathic Traits of Corporate Leadership as 
Predictors of Future Stock Returns 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether it is possible to forecast one-year-ahead returns of individual 
companies based on the observed ‘psychopathic’ characteristics of their top management 
team. We find that language characteristic of psychopaths present in annual report 
narratives, questionable integrity, excessive risk-taking and failure to contribute to 
charitable undertakings tend to reduce future shareholder wealth. These findings imply that 
firms could benefit from incorporating psychological evaluation in their recruitment 
processes, especially when seeking to fill senior management posts. While the return 
predictability described in this paper supports the upper echelons perspective, it 
simultaneously challenges the notion of informationally efficient stock prices.  
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Psychopathy is a personality disorder that may manifest itself as a result of abnormal brain 
connectivity, genetic or environmental factors (Marshall and Cooke, 1999; Taylor et al., 2003; Finger 
et al., 2011). A range of characteristics has been typically ascribed to psychopaths, amongst which 
parasitic and irresponsible behavior, pathological lying, emotional insensitivity, impairment of 
behavioral controls, elevated sense of self-worth and stimulation seeking feature prominently (Hare, 
2003). As noted by Boddy (2005, 2006), these people are often able to rise swiftly through the ranks of 
corporate hierarchy. Their insincere charm is sometimes mistaken for charisma, their ruthlessness may 
be viewed by some as the ability to make calculated business decisions, and their mastery of deception 
helps them to cover up their counterproductive and fraudulent activities. The implications of hiring 
psychopaths are potentially devastating for the companies involved. They bully and exploit junior co-
workers, create conflict within the workforce, undermine the reputation of the company, and promote 
a chaotic and unaccountable working environment in order to avoid scrutiny (Boddy, 2011a). While a 
fair amount of research has been conducted on the actions of psychopathic individuals within 
companies, actual estimation of the extent of shareholder value destruction arising from ‘psychopathic-
like’ behavior of the senior management team has not been attempted to date.  
The idea on which this paper is built is closely linked to the upper echelons perspective put 
forward by Hambrick and Mason (1984). This theoretical framework emphasizes that top executives 
perceive the situation in which the organization finds itself through the lens of their cognitive base and 
values. Their decisions and choices made under conditions of bounded rationality will consequently 
reflect this fact. The dominant coalition (Cyert and March, 1963) that molds corporate aims, values and 
actions may exhibit certain psychological traits which become a strong driving force for the company. 
Interestingly, Babiak et al. (2010) and Boddy (2011b) note that the proportion of psychopaths in 
managerial positions is higher than that in general population. As a consequence, this may have a 
tangible influence on corporate decision-making, with important ramifications for shareholders and 
broader society. This paper focuses specifically on the issue of whether psychopathic-like 
characteristics are able to predict future changes in shareholder wealth. Using UK data, we construct a 
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number of corporate psychopathy indicators and link them to the returns that ensue over the next 250 
trading days - a period roughly equivalent to one calendar year.  
 Even if clear guidance exists on how to diagnose psychopathic personality disorder in humans 
(Hare 1991, 2003), the practical difficulty is that executives will be generally unwilling to participate 
in time consuming surveys, particularly those that are likely to expose the dark side of their character. 
We choose to follow a more pragmatic approach and, similarly to Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), 
collect information in an unobtrusive way by going through company-related archives and data. Firstly, 
using automated content analysis we assess to what extent the language in annual report narratives is 
symptomatic of psychopathy. This is done by counting the frequency of words that are aggressive, 
characteristic of speakers who are self-absorbed and who have the tendency to assign blame to others. 
Secondly, we look at likely correlates of managerial integrity. More specifically, we try to identify 
companies whose auditors have expressed reservations in the Emphasis of Matter section of the annual 
report and those that have experienced a publicized Financial Reporting Council (FRC) intervention. 
Thirdly, we consider a measure that derives from the observation that psychopaths require stronger 
external stimuli to experience emotions and, therefore, have the tendency to take high risks. We assume 
that excessive exposure in a corporation will result in a high degree of idiosyncratic risk. This type of 
risk, which is entirely company-specific and unrelated to the broader economy, is measured in our 
empirical inquiry. Lastly, we construct a variable to capture the reluctance of a company to donate to 
charitable causes.  
  Our empirical investigation confirms conclusions of the earlier literature arguing that dark 
personalities are ineffective as corporate leaders (see for instance Boddy, 2011a; Stein, 2013; Kaiser et 
al., 2015). More specifically, we document a negative association between the presence of managerial 
psychopathic traits and future return on common equity. With the exception of FRC interventions, all 
psychopathy measures correlate with returns in a statistically significant way. Since the commonly 
stated objective of companies is to maximize shareholder wealth, obvious precautions need to be taken. 
In their recruitment and promotion process, human resource departments need to recognize the 
importance of psychological screening. Such screening needs to integrate information provided by past 
employers and colleagues, as well as verification of academic degrees and criminal record checks.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the behavioral 
tendencies of people with psychopathic personality disorder and the impact that these people have in 
their workplace. Section III elaborates on the theoretical underpinnings of our research and develops a 
testable hypothesis, while Section IV endeavors to develop quantitative measures capturing the degree 
of psychopathic behavior. Section V describes our data sources and key sample characteristics. Our 
empirical results and their interpretation are presented in Section VI. The following section presents 
robustness checks and considers additional tests germane to our story. The paper ends with conclusions 
and a set of practical recommendations. 
II. Psychopaths and Psychopathic Companies 
Pinel (1806) was the first author to consider cases of psychopathy, which were labeled by him as 
‘mania without delirium’. Further insights came from Cleckley (1941), whose book titled The Mask of 
Sanity remains, to date, one of the most important textbooks in the field. Whilst observing his patients 
confined within an institution, he realized that some of them were manipulative pathological liars who 
disregarded the feelings of others and were prone to outbursts of violence and antisocial behavior. At 
the same time, they appeared to be charming, had unimpaired intellectual capacity and did not exhibit 
any of the more usual symptoms of mental illness. Additional traits of psychopaths include a lack of 
conscience and empathy, a strong sense of entitlement and self-importance, thrill seeking, parasitic and 
promiscuous behavior, as well as failure to take responsibility for their actions.  
Hare (1991, 2003) designed a diagnostic tool called the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-
R) comprising 20 items characterizing a typical psychopath. Each item could be scored as 0 (the 
characteristic is not present), 1 (the characteristic applies only partially) or 2 (the characteristic is clearly 
observed). Individuals who obtained 75% or more of the maximum score would be deemed certifiably 
psychopathic. Less frequently utilized alternatives to PCL-R are the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory, a self-reported measure based on a questionnaire developed for adult non-criminal 
population (Lilienfeld and Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld and Widows, 2005) and the Comprehensive 
Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (Hoff et al., 2012). Several researchers, who recognized the 
devastating effects of psychopaths in corporations, designed additional diagnostic instruments suitable 
for the business context (B-Scan 360 (Mathieu et al., 2013) and the Psychopathy Measure – 
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Management Research Version (PM-MRV) (Boddy et al., 2010)).2 It is important to stress that 
psychopathy is classified as a personality disorder and not a mental illness. This means that insanity 
defense of an individual scoring over 30 on the PCL-R scale would be ineffective in a court of law 
(Boddy, 2011a: 170). Such individual would be unable to claim diminished responsibility under Anglo-
Saxon law (Shuman, 2003). 
An important discussion in the literature relates to whether the incidence of psychopathy is due 
to nature or nurture. In their study of male twins, Taylor et al. (2003) found that psychopathic traits 
were primarily associated with genetic factors. Further interesting results regarding brain connectivity 
have been obtained from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that measures the activity of 
the central nervous system by focusing on changes in blood flow. When making moral judgments, 
psychopaths exhibited abnormal activity in the moral and emotional neural circuit, particularly in the 
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex regions (see for instance Glenn et al., 2009; Finger et al., 2011; 
Marsh et al., 2011). While psychopathy may arise from genetic factors and atypical brain connectivity, 
environmental factors such as poor parenting, child abuse and use of drugs could also be considered as 
contributing factors in the manifestation and expression of the disorder (Weiler and Widom, 1996; 
Bernstein et al., 1998; Marshall and Cooke, 1999; Gao et al., 2010). Regrettably, efficacious treatments 
for psychopathy are not available at present (Harris and Rice, 2006). There appears to be a consensus 
among experts that psychopaths should be carefully monitored and managed rather than treated. 
Survey studies indicate that the prevalence of psychopathic personality disorder in the general 
population is roughly 1% (Neumann and Hare, 2008; Coid et al., 2009). This proportion is significantly 
higher among prison populations, reaching 15% for male offenders and 10% for female offenders 
(Babiak and Hare, 2006: 28). Interestingly, people with psychopathic tendencies who are not 
incarcerated and who choose to study at university level have a preference for business and commerce 
degrees (Wilson and McCarthy, 2011; Hassall et al., 2015). Driven by their insatiable appetite for 
money, power and prestige, these individuals are attracted to the corporate world and often end up in 
                                                          
2 The discussion on the suitability of different scales continues in the literature. One of the issues raised by Skeem 
and Cooke (2010) is that criminality may be a correlate rather than a component of psychopathy, which poses 
some conceptual difficulties for the PCL-R scale. For this reason, it is of central importance to focus also on other 
components of psychopathy, such as grandiosity, which is also a component of other diagnostic tools such as PM-
MRV and the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality.  
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positions of power. Board and Fritzon (2005) found significant incidence of the emotional components 
of psychopathic personality disorder in a sample of senior managers. Babiak et al. (2010) examined 203 
individuals who were selected by their employers to participate in management development programs 
and noted that 3.9% of them met or exceeded the psychopathy threshold. Results reported by Boddy 
(2011b), who examined a large sample of Australian senior white-collar workers, revealed that 5.75% 
of respondents were supervised by a psychopath at the time of the survey and nearly one third had 
worked with a psychopathic manager at least once throughout their career. Overall, the reading of the 
literature reveals that the concentration of psychopaths tends to be particularly high in prisons and 
boardrooms.  
 An important question arises at this stage. How do psychopaths, despite their serious character 
flaws and their general unwillingness to do an honest day of work, succeed in having spectacular 
corporate careers? Starting from the recruitment phase, such individuals tend to submit impressive CVs, 
although much of the supporting documentation may be forged (Babiak and Hare, 2006). Since they 
experience a rather limited range of emotions, they do not get stressed during interviews, appearing 
calm and collected. By propagating fiction, psychopaths create a false mask and hide behind a façade 
of exemplary employee and friend (Babiak and O’Toole, 2012). They try to ingratiate themselves with 
their superiors, whilst simultaneously exploiting junior colleagues and taking credit for their work 
(Boddy, 2005). Their superficial charm may oftentimes be mistaken for charisma, a quality possessed 
by great leaders. Their lack of empathy and innate callousness allow them to make difficult business 
decisions, such as those about mass dismissals, swiftly and without any moral qualms. Being 
accomplished manipulators of people and their environment, they may find gaining promotion 
relatively easy.  
 The illusion of a motivated worker is eclipsed by the myriad of devastating effects that 
psychopaths have on their corporations. Being both impulsive and parasitic, psychopaths often treat 
those who are lower in the organizational hierarchy unfavorably, for example by shouting at them and 
getting into rude arguments. Boddy (2011b, 2014) estimates that around 26% to 35% of bullying in 
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corporations is accounted for by the behavior of psychopaths.3 These individuals create chaos 
deliberately, in order to deflect the blame for failure or to hide their unlawful activities. On reaching 
supervisory positions, they refuse to share information, provide inadequate training to others, give 
confusing instructions and introduce self-serving rules and procedures (Boddy, 2011a). Such actions 
result in reduced employee job satisfaction (Mathieu et al., 2014), make it difficult to retain good staff, 
and undermine productivity (Boddy, 2010). A recent paper by Boddy and Taplin (2016) argues that the 
presence of workplace psychopathy is the ‘dominant predictor’ of job satisfaction. Furthermore, 
psychopaths are antisocial and self-centered individuals, who have complete disregard for corporate 
social responsibility concerns (Boddy, 2011a), exhibit propensity to commit economic crimes (Babiak 
and O’Toole, 2012) and destroy the reputation of their employer (Boddy, 2012). Their constant need 
for stimulation may induce excessive risk-taking, putting the entire company in jeopardy.    
III. Theoretical Model and Hypothesis 
In its approach, our paper adopts the upper echelons perspective developed by Hambrick and 
Mason (1984). This particular theory rests on the idea that the situation faced by top management teams 
is usually informationally complex and subject to many uncertainties (Hambrick, 2007). As such, it 
invites individualized interpretations which give prominence to behavioral factors in decision-making. 
More specifically, stimuli received by senior managers will be filtered through their cognitive base and 
value system, thereby shaping their perceptions, strategic choices and, in turn, organizational outcomes. 
The notion of bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958) underpins the 
upper echelons perspective in that the information is subject to interpretation and the decision-making 
process is influenced by cognitive biases of the top management team. One practical difficulty that 
arises in empirical investigations is the lack of psychometric data on executives. Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) encourage the use of observable proxies for the differences in managerial cognitions and values. 
In their reviews, Carpenter et al. (2004) and Plöckinger et al. (2016) note that the body of literature 
                                                          
3 In a follow-up paper Boddy and Taplin (2017) argue that these estimates may understate the psychopathic 
bullying problem due to the peculiarities of scales used in the research. 
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produced thus far in this field has, to a large extent, supported the baseline Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
model, although extensions of the original framework have been proposed.  
 This paper investigates whether a specific leadership personality trait impacts on arguably the 
most important corporate outcomes - shareholder wealth and economic efficiency. Our empirical 
inquiry could thus be viewed as a test of the upper echelons theory. Prior research provided some 
indication that leadership characteristics can be linked to firm performance. Collins and Clarke (2003) 
documented that size, strength and range of top management’s social networks positively affect sales 
growth and stock returns. In the M&A context, Krishnan, Miller and Judge (1997) show that post-
acquisition ROA depends on the complementarity of the management teams in both companies. 
Although our study also focuses on performance, we concentrate on different characteristics of the 
executives. More specifically, we investigate how the correlates of managerial psychopathy influence 
shareholder wealth.   
There could be two possible channels through which boardroom psychopathy could affect stock 
prices. First, the profitability of companies could be negatively affected by psychopathic leaders. 
Counterproductive work behavior in response to bullying and exploitation, inability to retain key staff 
members, fraudulent activities and deliberate chaos created by psychopaths, as well as their parasitic 
behavior (Boddy, 2011a) can all contribute to a reduction in profitability. Since cash flows to equity 
and dividends, the key inputs into the cash flow valuation (Fisher, 1930; Williams, 1938) and the 
dividend discount (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956) models, hinge upon profitability, psychopathic leaders 
can cause a drop in stock market valuations. Second, psychopathic attributes of decision making may 
potentially lead to reputational damage. Media controversies, audit problems, lack of involvement in 
charitable giving and corporate social responsibility activities can put the company into disrepute and 
lower the value of its intangible assets. This will be reflected in negative stock market returns, as was 
the case with reduced profitability.   
From a theoretical perspective, it is also important to elaborate on the meaning of the term 
‘psychopathy’, as used in our paper. We are not using this term in the strictly medical sense, as the task 
of diagnosing psychopathic personality disorder is incredibly complex. A medical professional cannot 
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simply rely on an interview with the subject, as psychopaths will almost certainly provide untruthful 
responses. Very careful background checks need to be performed and co-workers or people who 
frequently interact with the subject need to be interviewed to corroborate the evidence. Some of the 
information that needs to be collected is highly sensitive in nature and relates, for instance, to the 
subject’s sexual behavior. Due to time constraints, top management would be unwilling to voluntarily 
participate in such invasive probing and, should they agree to take part, their responses would be 
affected by social desirability bias (Chatterrjee and Hambrick, 2007). These problems are compounded 
by the fact that it is practically impossible to carry out any evaluation of past executives of the company. 
Realistically, an average investor would never have the opportunity to collect all the particulars required 
for a reliable psychological diagnostic check.  
We therefore adopt a more pragmatic approach. Instead of focusing on each manager 
separately, we focus on the senior management team as a whole and reflect on what company 
characteristics are likely to be highly correlated with the presence of psychopaths in its decision-making 
structures. In doing so, we focus on what Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) refer to as ‘unobtrusive 
measures’. The psychopathic tendencies of the corporate leadership are proxied here by several 
indicators, which are based on information available from archives and financial datasets. These 
indicators can be constructed by market participants and are described in detail in the following section. 
As they reflect company-level decisions and strategies, they pertain to the entire top management team 
and their collective decision making. Hambrick and Mason (1984) clearly state that the unit of analysis 
in the context of upper echelons theory should be the entire top management team. This is because a 
typical CEO shares power with other executives and directors, delegating some of the decision-making.4  
An interesting question that arises at this stage is how psychopathic tendencies of one individual 
may be propagated within a group. Hypothetical channels could be considered here. Prior research has 
shown that employees respond to abusive supervision with workplace deviance and reduced effort to 
further corporate goals (Zellars et al. 2002; Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007). Psychopaths are often 
aggressive towards their subordinates, exploit them and take credit for their achievements. This may 
                                                          




provoke negative reciprocity and, as the retributions spiral out of control, the behavior of co-workers 
may start resembling that of the psychopath. Moreover, a psychopath who is a senior executive may 
incentivize others to behave in ways that he or she considers appropriate and create a culture of ignoble 
behavior. Treviño, Brown and Hartman (2003) pointed out that top executives set the ethical climate 
and culture within their companies. This is confirmed by two case studies (Boddy and Croft, 2016; 
Boddy, 2017) evidencing swift changes in organizational ethics and ethos following appointment of 
new psychopathic CEOs. 
Ashforth (1994) theorizes how the leadership style of ‘petty tyrants’ can introduce a culture of 
fear within the organization. ‘Petty tyrants’ were defined by Ashforth as small-minded, inconsiderate, 
brutal leaders who have a penchant for self-aggrandizement, bullying and belittling those of lower rank 
in the corporate hierarchy. This definition largely overlaps with the characteristics of psychopathic work 
behavior. Ashforth (1994) presents evidence that the outcomes of the culture of fear are destructive to 
the corporation. Workers feel helpless and alienated, which inhibits their motivation and performance. 
Their frustrations may be vented through misplaced aggression against their co-workers rather than the 
tyrannical leader. The cohesiveness of the work unit suffers as a result of the hostilities experienced. 
Erosion of work ethic and cultural downfall are likely to cause distress amongst all employees, with the 
notable exception of those who are characterized by shallow affect. Hurst et al. (in press) show 
empirically that employees with high psychopathy scores on the interpersonal and affective dimensions 
react less adversely to abusive supervision, allowing them to stay in that workplace for longer. This, in 
turn, enables a culture of mistreatment to become more persistent.5 
Our discussion in Sections II and III indicated that the presence of psychopaths in the workplace 
could be detrimental to the company employing them. Combining this with the predictions of the upper 
echelons theory, one could argue that the manifestations of psychopathic personality disorder are 
particularly destructive to the firm’s value when the individuals exhibiting such tendencies have large 
influence over corporate decisions. This leads us to the development of the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
5 Since managers have a tendency to hire applicants with similar attitudes (Orpen, 1984), one could suspect that 
psychopathic managers would prioritize other like-minded individuals in the recruitment process.  Unfortunately, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence in the literature regarding this particular issue.  
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Hypothesis: Psychopathic behavior of top management team causes significant losses in 
shareholder wealth. 
Several words of clarification are in order. We use the word “causes” in the Granger (1969) 
sense. Our dependent variable represented by future returns on the stocks of a given company is linked 
to the current level of leadership psychopathic traits. This temporal difference permits us to make 
inferences about causality. It also eliminates the problem of reverse causality, as it is unlikely that 
current managerial personality characteristics will be influenced by the unknown future returns. 
Furthermore, failure to reject our hypothesis would be equivalent to challenging the idealistic notion of 
market efficiency – a situation in which stock prices instantly reflect all available information (Fama, 
1970).  
The mechanism of action behind any return predictability merits further reflection. According 
to the upper echelons theory, the personality characteristics of top managers are important for the 
evolution of stock prices. However, they are not easily observable by investors and some degree of 
imprecision and subjectivity will be inherent in their evaluations. The degree of imprecision may 
decrease over time, as more information becomes available. Making inferences about psychological 
tendencies of managers from the publicly available data, however, is a very complex and formidable 
task. If one adopts the bounded rationality perspective (Simon, 1957), one will argue that, due to the 
cognitive limitations of their minds, investors will require time to process such complex information 
and their inferences will be to some degree inefficient. What we are presenting in this paper is a 
formalized process facilitating the task of managerial personality assessment. If our empirical model 
offers improvement over the intuition of an average trader, traces of return predictability will be 
observed.  
To the best knowledge of the authors, the hypothesis specified above has not been previously 
tested in the literature. One may be tempted to draw parallels to studies focusing on how managerial 
hubris and narcissism affect different organizational outcomes (Roll, 1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005; Higgs, 2009; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Stein, 2013; Grijalva 
and Harms, 2014; Zhu and Chen, 2015). Narcissists are individuals with great self-confidence and an 
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unjustified sense of omniscience and omnipotence. More extreme manifestations of this disorder could 
entail impulses to belittle others or vengefulness (Stein, 2013). Psychopaths, however, are more inclined 
to get involved in anti-social and criminal activities, therefore posing a much greater danger to their 
employers. One may also argue that leadership effectiveness has been previously linked to the Big Five 
personality traits (see for instance Peterson et al., 2003; Smith and Canger, 2004; Nadkarni and 
Herrmann, 2010) and that psychopathy is merely an extreme constellation of these traits. However, this 
view is overly simplistic, as Ashton et al. (2000) show that more than the five basic factors may be 
needed to capture such a complex personality disorder. Consequently, the concept of ‘psychopathy’ in 
the context of corporate leadership requires separate investigation.  
IV. Empirical Proxies for the Existence of Corporate Psychopaths 
 Psychopathic tendencies of top management could potentially be detected by examining the 
manner in which a company communicates with the external world, by the veracity of its reporting, as 
well as its attitudes towards philanthropy and risk-taking. This section provides a detailed description 
of the empirical instruments used to capture the extent of psychopathic behavior.  
4.1. Presence of psychopathic language in corporate communications 
A paper in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin by Woodworth et al. (2012) presents persuasive 
arguments attesting to the fact that psychopathic personality profiles can be recognized by word usage. 
The recommendation of the authors to enforcement officers is that automatic linguistic analysis 
software should be utilized to accomplish this task. In a similar vein, Hancock et al. (2013) argued that, 
although psychopaths have an unparalleled ability to fake emotions to further their selfish goals, the 
operation of language is non-conscious and much more difficult to alter. By employing linguistic 
analysis tools, they demonstrate that the language of psychopathic and non-psychopathic murderers 
differs markedly. Another study by Intrator et al. (1997) applied computer tomography to map cerebral 
blood flow during a lexical task. This brain imaging approach revealed that psychopaths exhibit 
abnormalities in the processing of semantic content. Taken together, this literature suggests that the 
language used by people with psychopathic personality disorder has its own unique features and could 
potentially be recognized using linguistic analysis tools.  
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By employing computerized content analysis, we try to measure the frequency of linguistic 
expressions present in company communications that are characteristic of psychopaths. While there are 
many types of news items and announcements, we decided to concentrate on annual report narratives. 
By narrative, we mean the contents of an annual report with the financial statements and the notes to 
the accounts removed. The documents analyzed are primarily qualitative in nature, of sufficient length 
to permit reliable content analysis6 and, perhaps most importantly, include statements from the most 
senior people in a company. A typical annual report will contain non-audited statements from the 
Chairman and CEO, as well as a directors’ report. We want to note that the structure of narratives is 
relatively similar across different UK non-financial companies, as the Companies Act 2006 and the 
amendments to this Act introduced in 2013 mandate inclusion of specific sections in the document. 
While there may be structural similarity, which allows valid comparisons to be made, the managerial 
teams can still exercise a great deal of discretion over how information is phrased, expressed and 
presented.  
 The narratives are analyzed using text analysis software called Diction. By now, this computer 
program has become an integral part of the content analysis landscape and, according to the latest count, 
was used by the authors of 16 books, 61 book chapters and 162 refereed journal articles.7 Diction 
includes 31 thesauruses (word lists) capturing certain characteristics of language. For instance, the word 
list labeled ‘Praise’ includes many words such as ‘admirable’, ‘magnificent’ or ‘brilliant’. The software 
computes the frequency with which words from a given thesaurus appear in a text and reports the 
number of occurrences for an average 500-word text segment. In our opinion, four of the Diction’s word 
lists could be particularly useful for our empirical investigation. 
Firstly, according to the PCL-R diagnostic tool, a psychopath would typically have a ‘grandiose 
sense of self-worth’. Such individuals would be self-centered, convinced of their own superiority and 
would always attempt to take credit for any positive developments. One would expect that, in their 
communications, psychopaths would frequently refer to themselves and their factual or imaginary 
                                                          
6 As has been noted by Grimmer and Stewart (2013: 272), the reliability of linguistic style identification increases 
with word count.  




achievements. Interestingly, Diction has a Self-Reference dictionary, which includes, amongst others, 
words such as ‘I’, ‘myself’, ‘my’ or ‘mine’. Egoists would have a tendency to use these words more 
often. Secondly, psychopaths show complete disregard for the feelings and well-being of others. As a 
result, they may use the words listed in Diction’s Human Interest dictionary less frequently. This 
particular word stock includes personal pronouns (e.g. ‘them’, ‘he’, ‘she’), family members and 
relations (e.g. ‘mother’, ‘uncle’, ‘parent’) and other terms describing individuals or groups of people 
(e.g. ‘gentlemen’, ‘friend’, ‘ladies’). Thirdly, psychopaths have weak behavioral controls and can 
exhibit impulsivity. They are often aggressive and many of them end up convicted for committing 
violent crimes. One could reasonably expect that a corporate psychopath will often articulate ideas using 
words included in the Diction’s Aggression corpus, such as ‘demolish’, ‘conquer’, or ‘attacking’. Lastly, 
people diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder refuse to take responsibility for their own 
actions and have the propensity to blame others for poor outcomes. Diction’s Blame thesaurus, that can 
be useful here, includes words associated with faulting the circumstances or other individuals (e.g. 
‘undependable’, ‘terrible’, ‘stupid’).   
We calculate the frequencies with which words from these four Diction thesauruses appear in 
annual report narratives. These frequencies are subsequently converted into z-scores. For instance, if 
aggressive words in a given annual report i appear with frequency Aggressioni we will scale it by 
deducting sample average and dividing by sample standard deviation as follows: 
Z(Aggressioni) = (Aggressioni – E(Aggressioni))/σ (Aggressioni) [1] 
We construct our measure of corporate psychopathic language as follows: 
Psychopathic_languagei = Z(Self Referencei) –Z(Human Interesti) + Z(Aggressioni) + Z(Blamei) [2] 
Converting frequencies into z-scores ensures that each of the four components is of equal importance 
when they are aggregated into a single construct. Standardization of frequencies is applied routinely in 
the Diction software, whenever subaltern variables are amalgamated into broader constructs.   
 One of the criticism of our language measure could be that, even if the corporate leaders 
contribute to annual report narratives, their contribution may be reviewed by accountants, lawyers and 
16 
 
PR specialists. There are, however, several practical considerations that may attenuate the impact of 
such critique. First, as long as investors believe that the text has been produced by those in charge, its 
characteristics will have the capacity to influence stock returns. In fact, market participants may have 
no reason to be suspicious, as many of the sections in the annual report are undersigned by the directors. 
Second, even if corrections to the narrative are introduced by moderators, these corrections are likely 
to pertain to facts and figures. However, our methodological approach does not assess what the directors 
are saying, but rather how they are saying it. In other words, it is the linguistic characteristics and their 
writing style that is being assessed here and these features are unlikely to be significantly modified in 
any revision process. Thirdly, employees may not have the courage to correct a superior with 
psychopathic tendencies, as such individuals are renowned for being vindictive (Smith et al., 2012). 
Maibom (2008) reports that the leading cause of murder among homicidal psychopaths is revenge or 
retribution. Although corporate psychopaths may have greater ability to control their dark urges, their 
interpersonal and affective tendencies will be similar to those of their incarcerated counterparts. In his 
case study, Boddy (2017) vividly illustrated that, in the face of criticism and dissent, psychopathic 
corporate leaders can indeed respond with bullying and intimidation. 
4.2. Proxies for questionable integrity 
Pathological lying and propensity to commit fraud are hallmarks of a psychopath. Surrendering 
to these compulsions could be problematic for employees in companies subject to regular audits. This 
point is stressed by Klarskov Jeppsen and Leder (2016) who performed a survey of Danish auditors. 
According to their findings, 69 percent of their respondents had encountered at least one psychopathic 
manager and 43 percent of these managers had committed fraud. It would be interesting to examine the 
opinion of auditors regarding the veracity of corporate reporting in our sample.  
We have read audit reports in all of the narratives included in our sample and none was 
qualified. This may not be particularly surprising, as managers are aware of the detrimental impact that 
a qualified report could have on reputation, pricing and cost of capital. With this awareness, they 
typically negotiate with auditors the changes that are required in order for the report to be unqualified. 
Although the reports do not explicitly modify financial statements, on occasions auditors express their 
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reservations regarding specific figures or statements in the Emphasis of Matter section. They may, for 
instance, emphasize that certain entries in the financial statements may be impossible to verify or that 
they are subject to substantial uncertainty. Such situations suggest that auditors do not have full 
confidence in the reported figures and we create a dummy variable labeled Audit_Problems to indicate 
these cases.  
In an attempt to measure the veracity of the top management team, we also collected data on 
the actions of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) - a regulator empowered to investigate accounting 
and reporting irregularities in the UK. We searched FRC’s news archive to check whether any formal 
investigation was launched, or disciplinary action taken in relation to our sample companies. A 
publicized intervention constitutes a significant signal, as corrections of minor misstatements are 
typically consulted between FRC and the issuer in confidence. It is important to note that the jurisdiction 
of FRC is not limited to financial statements, but also extends to narrative reporting where exaggerated 
and misleading statements could easily be made. We constructed a dummy variable FRC_Action to 
indicate company-years in which an intervention of the regulator has taken place.  
4.3. Excessive risk taking 
The emotional range of psychopaths is somewhat limited, which is likely due to their brain 
connectivity. They need much stronger external stimulus to feel excitement and exhilaration. To avoid 
boredom, they are involved in a constant search for thrills and take excessive and unnecessary risks. 
This is commonly recognized among psychiatrists and the diagnostic tool of PID-5 (Personality 
Inventory for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition) explicitly 
considers excessive risk taking as one of the manifestations of psychopathy. There is also substantial 
empirical literature linking psychopathic personality disorder to the tendency to make risky decisions 
(see for instance Blair et al., 2001; Swogger et al., 2010; Hosker-Field et al., 2016; Snowden et al., 
2017). 
Therefore, it can be argued that a psychopath-led company would be characterized by an 
unusually high risk level. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) introduced by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) teaches us that the total risk of a company can be decomposed into 
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systematic and company-specific (idiosyncratic) risk. The former component is related to general 
market conditions, while the latter is, to a large extent, related to managerial actions. In order to gauge 
company-specific risk, we run the following regressions: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 �𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑡𝑡 ∈ [−250,−1]  [3] 
The estimation period is selected relative to the date of disclosure (t=0) of a given annual report. Ri 
denotes the return on the company issuing an annual report i, RM is the return on the FTSE 350 stock 
market index, while RF is the daily equivalent of the 3-month UK LIBOR rate acting here as a proxy 
for the risk-free rate. Our Idiosyncratic_Risk variable is calculated as the standard deviation of the 
residuals (ε) from regression [3]. In other words, Idiosyncratic_Risk is the component of the riskiness 
that is orthogonal to overall market fluctuations and should take high values whenever part of the 
managerial team is exhibiting psychopathic behavior.  
4.4. Lack of empathy 
The PCL-R scale includes items capturing callousness, lack of empathy and parasitic behavior 
oriented towards satisfying egoistic needs. From the point of view of a management, such attitudes 
could manifest themselves through disregard for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in general and 
charitable giving in particular. Simply put, philanthropy involves altruistic donation without expecting 
anything in return. Such a notion is completely alien and absurd to somebody with a psychopathic 
personality disorder. This inborn psychopathic instinct may however be considered misguided when 
one considers the bigger picture. Corporate donors often experience increased brand recognition and 
reputation (Smith, 1994; Brammer and Millington, 2005). They also accumulate ‘moral capital’, which 
can shield intangible assets and increase shareholder wealth (Godfrey, 2005). Considerations about 
intangible assets aside, we would expect corporations led by people with psychopathic traits to give less 
money to good causes.  
The extent to which money is given can be easily measured in our study as, during our sample 
period, companies were disclosing details of their charitable donations in the directors’ report section 
of their annual reports. Since our empirical measure needs to recognize the fact that, nominally 
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speaking, large companies can commit larger resources to charitable undertakings, we scale the amount 
donated in a given fiscal year by the market capitalization of the firm. As such, this scaled proxy 
measures altruism, rather than lack of empathy. Transforming it by taking reciprocal8 is impossible, as 
for non-donating companies we would face the problem of dividing market capitalization by zero. 
Instead, we simply multiply the altruism measure by -1 to arrive at the following variable: 
Lack_of_Empathyi = -(Charitable Donationsi /Market Capitalization of the Firmi) [4] 
By construction, Lack_of_Empathy peaks at zero for non-donating firms and reaches a minimum of -1 
in the hypothetical case in which a firm decides to give away all of its wealth to charitable causes.   
V. Data 
As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this paper is to check whether psychopathy proxies 
can forecast firms’ returns over the following 250 trading days. The prediction horizon is roughly 
equivalent to one calendar year, as most of the data needed to construct our proxies is sourced from 
annual reports. The returns are chosen as the dependent variable, as they measure changes in future 
shareholders’ wealth. Returns may be preferred to accounting performance measures in the context of 
our study, as corporate psychopaths have the tendency to manipulate financial numbers and commit 
fraud (Klarskov Jeppesen and Leder, 2016). Lambert and Larcker (1987: 114) argued that accounting 
numbers are less useful as a performance metric compared to market returns in situations where the 
ramifications of managerial decisions extend beyond one fiscal year. Additionally, successful 
predictions of future returns can change the fortunes of investors and lead to development of practical 
trading recommendations. Such benefits may not be attainable when modelling accounting profitability, 
as Lev (1989) indicated that the correlation between earnings and returns is very modest and unstable. 
Our study focuses on the constituents of the FTSE350 index, however, a number of firms had 
to be eliminated in the process of cleaning the sample. Firstly, we excluded 72 companies involved in 
financial intermediation, as the structure of their annual report narratives is significantly different due 
                                                          
8 By reciprocal we mean (Market Capitalization of the Firm/Charitable Donations). 
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to existing regulations.9 We note that other studies performing content analysis in the UK context also 
removed financial institutions from their sample (e.g. Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Schleicher and 
Walker, 2010). Secondly, we excluded all firms that have been subject to a merger or a takeover during 
the time frame considered. Lastly, we did not include companies for which annual reports and sufficient 
data on financial performance could not be found. As a result of imposing these sample selection 
criteria, we ended up with a total of 209 firms and 1,262 firm-years.  
The annual reports used in this study were sourced from the web pages of companies, 
Bloomberg and Morningstar. We examined the reports published during the period ranging from 
January 2006 to June 2013. Since this study scrutinizes returns accruing to investors within 
approximately one year following the publication date, our return sample ends in June 2014. In order 
to determine an accurate annual report publication date, we collected information on the timing of 
disclosure in Morningstar and Bloomberg, to see which one occurred first. A practical complication 
that arises in our analysis relates to the fact that annual reports in the UK are usually published in pdf 
format. We had to convert these files to plain text before carrying out our automated content analysis 
in Diction. For conversion purposes, we used Convert PDF to Word Desktop Software and, for 
predominantly picture-based reports, an optical character recognition system called Smart OCR. Checks 
have been performed to verify whether the conversion to text was faithful and any detected 
inconsistencies were manually fixed. Financial section was removed from the annual reports, as it is 
mostly quantitative and written in accordance with regulatory standards and conventions. This leaves 
little space for management to express their personality and views within its content. The final files 
were analyzed using Diction, which allowed us to construct the Psychopatic_language variable.  
Another two psychopathic proxies, namely Audit_Problems and Lack_of_Empathy were also 
constructed based on the information provided in the annual reports. The first one is a dummy taking a 
value of 1 when auditors express reservations in the Emphasis of Matter section. In order to construct 
the second variable, we sourced information on charitable donations from the directors’ report section. 
Where this amount was expressed in foreign currency, we converted it to British pounds at the end of 
                                                          
9 Financial institutions have to comply with IAS30 and Basel Accord and their published narratives concentrate 
a lot of attention on fulfilment of these regulations. 
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fiscal year exchange rate reported in the annual report. In cases where data on exchange rates was not 
reported, we sourced it from the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database. The market 
capitalization used for scaling the donations figure was downloaded from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
In order to compile the list of actions that the Financial Reporting Council took against our sample 
companies, we performed searches of the online FRC news archive. This subsequently allowed us to 
construct the FRC_Action variable. Finally, the stock price data needed to construct both the 
Idiosyncratic_Risk and the dependent variable was taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
In an attempt to cleanly isolate the influence of psychopathic traits, we need to control for a 
range of other factors that could potentially affect future returns. For instance, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) implies that stock returns should 
be a linear function of company’s beta, which is related to the amount of systematic risk. Consequently, 
we include the firm’s beta (Beta) estimated immediately prior to the annual report announcement date 
as one of our regressors. Similarly, the size of the company could be considered to be of significance. 
Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992) showed that, historically, smaller stocks earned higher returns 
for investors. This could represent compensation for the undesirable characteristics of small companies, 
such as higher risk and transaction costs, as well as low liquidity. To control for these effects, we 
construct a Size variable, which is equal to the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. 
Additionally, we include the book-to-market ratio in our regressions to account for the finding of 
Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) that this ratio has predictive power for returns.  
 Furthermore, we need to control for the financial performance of the company, which is 
quantified in the annual report. At the same time, however, we recognize the fact that much of the 
informational content inherent in this type of annual disclosure may have been incorporated in stock 
prices at an earlier date, as many of the UK companies publish quarterly and half-yearly financial 
results. The first performance variable we construct is Earnings_Growth, defined as the difference 
between the current and previous year’s earnings per share scaled by share price. Moreover, guided by 
the observation of Jordan, Waldron, and Clark (2007) that sales have important ramifications for the 
value of common equity, we build a measure labeled Sales_Increase which captures the year-to-year 
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percentage growth in the firm’s turnover. The first difference in financial leverage (∆Leverage) is also 
included as an explanatory variable, due to the fact that indebtedness is one of the important 
determinants of bankruptcy risk (Altman, 1968). All of the information required to construct our control 
variables was sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Last but not least, we take account of business cycle variation. This is necessary, as our sample 
witnessed a period of recession, which exerted its influence on capital markets and asset prices. To 
capture the macroeconomic environment, we used monthly data on growth in industrial production, 
inflation in Consumer Price Index and changes in the harmonized unemployment rate. This data has 
been sourced from Key Short-Term Economic Indicators published by OECD. For any given company-
year, the information on macroeconomic aggregates is recorded for a month in which the annual report 
was first disseminated. Table I provides a complete list of variables used in our study, with their 
corresponding definitions. 
[Table I about here] 
[Table II about here] 
The summary statistics reported in Table II reveal interesting characteristics of our sample and 
aptly describe the underlying processes. Since the Psychopatic_Language variable is composed of four 
z-scores, its mean by construction is equal to zero. In 1.19% of company-years, auditors indicated some 
issues in the Emphasis of Matter section and 0.24% of observations could be linked to publicized FRC 
interventions. In a representative year, companies donated an equivalent of 0.05% of their market 
capitalization to charitable causes. Furthermore, the period under consideration was characterized by 
declining corporate profits, which occurred despite increasing sales. Macroeconomic context was 
unfavorable, with an average company-year experiencing a slight decline in industrial production and 
a rise in unemployment. Stock market fluctuations reflected the adverse conditions of credit crunch and, 
nominally speaking, the equally-weighted annual return barely exceeded 3%.  
[Table III about here] 
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Table III presents Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in our study. 
Interestingly, all gauges of psychopathy correlate negatively with future returns. For 4 out of the 5 
proxies considered the relationship with returns is statistically significant. Such results imply that 
managerial psychopathic behavior is an ominous sign of shareholder wealth destruction. This 
conclusion needs to be tempered by the fact that correlation analysis is rather simplistic and additional 
controls need to be introduced in order to arrive at more definitive conclusions. Importantly, Table III 
shows that the correlations between explanatory variables are not particularly high, which means that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be present in the regressions that will follow. Multicollinearity leads to 
less stable parameter estimates and inflation of their standard errors. According to Chatterjee and Price 
(1991), variance inflation factors (VIFs) above the value of 10 are indicative of this econometric 
problem. Since the highest VIF in our regressions is equal to 1.34, we are confident that this issue is 
immaterial. 
VI. Empirical Results 
 Two modeling approaches are adopted in order to link the future stock returns to managerial 
psychopathy proxies and control variables. Regressions (1)-(4) in Table IV employ a simple pooled 
OLS estimation. Furthermore, since our data has an unbalanced panel structure we also utilize panel 
data methods. Hausman (1978) tests indicate lack of orthogonality between random effects and the 
regressors, which implies that fixed effect panel needs to be used in order to obtain consistent estimates. 
Such panel is superior to the pooled specification in that it controls for time-invariant differences across 
firms. We attempted to estimate panel equivalents of the regressions (1)-(4) and report these in the Table 
V. However, when company dummies are added into model (1) they appear to be jointly insignificant. 
This means that, in this particular case, panel estimation is not advisable, as it will cause inefficiency 
and not lead to notable improvements in the goodness of fit.   
One important aspect needs to be stressed at this point. All information required to construct 
our company-specific explanatory variables is available on the annual report publication date (Day 0). 
On the other hand, the stock returns, which act as our dependent variable, are measured in a (1,250) 
event window relative to the publication day. This means that models (1)-(3) in Table IV, as well as 
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their corresponding analogues in Table V, can be interpreted as predictive regressions. Models 
incorporating business cycle proxies are not predictive in the strict sense of this word, as information 
about macroeconomic aggregates is typically released with some delay.  
 [Table IV about here] 
[Table V about here] 
 Examination of Tables IV and V reveals several interesting relationships. The first observation 
is that the Psychopathic_Language variable bears a negative coefficient and is statistically significant 
in all specifications. Only employees with sufficient authority to influence the wording of annual report 
narratives can alter the value of this variable. Consequently, this measure captures the degree to which 
psychopathic behavior has permeated the higher echelons of corporate power. When power is combined 
with reckless and self-serving comportment, the consequences for the company can be particularly dire. 
This is reflected in our estimates. In general, our finding is in line with Boddy (2011a), who labels 
psychopaths as 'organizational destroyers’. 
 We also observe that the reluctance of auditors to approve an annual report without any word 
of warning, as well as the launch of FRC investigations, are prognosticators of inferior future returns. 
The latter regressor, however, lacks statistical power, which could possibly be linked to the fact that 
publicized FRC interventions are very infrequent. As mentioned earlier, both Audit_Problems and 
FRC_Action are indicators for questionable integrity. Extant research documents that events 
undermining confidence in firm’s or managerial honesty, such as publication of restatements or alleged 
financial fraud, provoke strong and immediate stock price declines (see, for instance, Palmrose et al., 
2004 and Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). What differentiates our findings from those reported in the 
literature is that we document the importance of trustworthiness in making medium-term return 
predictions. All of our regressions indicate that one-year-ahead returns are significantly lower for firms 
whose published annual report includes auditors’ comments in the Emphasis of Matter section.  
 With regard to Idiosyncratic_Risk our results and rationalizations are quite interesting, 
particularly in view of the discord that exists between the theoretical and empirical literature on this 
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subject. Some theoretical models predict a positive nexus between idiosyncratic risk and returns (Levy, 
1978; Merton, 1987), primarily due to the compensation demanded by under-diversified investors. On 
the other hand, Ang et al. (2006) and Ang et al. (2009) show that stocks with high historical 
idiosyncratic volatility offer ‘abysmal’ rewards to investors. We confirm these empirical findings in our 
sample and propound an explanation for the observed phenomenon. Psychopathic managers, who are 
by their very nature impulsive and stimulation-seeking, are likely to approve very risky projects without 
making any attempt to hedge out or diversify away the risk. Since, as we argued earlier, their presence 
is detrimental to the companies they work for, a low return and high company-specific risk constellation 
will form. In other words, to fully explain the negative association between Idiosyncratic_Risk and 
Returns, one needs to move beyond the rational portfolio optimization framework and consider 
behavioral factors.   
 With regard to the Lack_of_Empathy variable, we note that firms failing to donate to charitable 
causes experience lower future returns. Seen through the psychopathic lens, philanthropy appears to be 
counterproductive, as prima facie the company is not expected to benefit from such activity. Such a 
view, however, proves to be simplistic and rather one-dimensional. Corporate charitable giving has 
been shown to improve customer perception, thereby increasing the revenue of the donating firm (Lev 
et al., 2010). The study of Patten (2008) reported that companies announcing donations to the 2004 
Southeast Asia tsunami relief effort recorded an abnormal increase in their stock prices. In similar vein, 
our findings indicate that engagement in charitable undertakings enhances the future wealth of 
shareholders. Since empathy-lacking psychopathic corporate leaders shy away from such undertakings, 
the returns on their companies are significantly reduced.  
 Several interesting observations can also be made with regard to our control variables. The 
insignificance of Beta illustrates the failure of the Capital Asset Pricing Model to explain more recent 
data. Fama and French (1992) argued that size and book-to-market variables have much greater power 
to explain return distribution compared to CAPM’s beta. Our findings concur with their inferences. The 
negative coefficient on the Size variable is particularly intriguing from the point of view of our 
theorizing. Babiak and Hare (2006: 97) argue that, when searching for new employers, psychopaths 
will have a strong preference for big companies. In their constant search for ego gratification, they will 
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apply for positions that offer the best opportunities to gain more money and power. Such opportunities 
may be sparse in small capitalization firms. If the argument of Babiak and Hare (2006: 97) is correct, 
one would expect a positive correlation between the incidence of psychopaths and market capitalization 
of a company, which could explain the negative coefficient.  
The three controls constructed from accounting figures published in the annual report are 
statistically insignificant in our predictive regressions. This is not particularly surprising, as the yearly 
figures can be reasonably accurately forecasted based on interim results published by companies prior 
to their annual reports. This means that much of the information content inherent in annual financial 
statements has been discounted in prices at an earlier date and is of little use for return forecasting 
purposes. Our interpretation coheres with the results of Ball and Brown (1968), who argue that about 
85 to 90 percent of the income statement’s information published in annual reports has already been 
captured by earlier reports.   
 With regard to macroeconomic controls, the results conform to intuition and existing theory. 
As documented previously by Chen et al. (1986) and Nasseh and Strauss (2000), fortunes of the stock 
market are dependent on whether the economy is expanding. Inflation appears to be detrimental to stock 
valuations. In an inflationary environment, firms may struggle to pass through their escalating costs 
onto the consumer. At the same time, nominal discount rates rise swiftly, depressing the market value 
of equity. When interpreting the coefficient on ∆Unemployment, one needs to realize that the total 
impact of joblessness figures is unclear from a theoretical perspective. On one hand, unemployment 
represents inefficient allocation of resources and may be symptomatic of a weak economy. On the other 
hand, news of rising unemployment may change the direction of monetary policy and reduce interest 
rates, leading thereby to stock price increases (Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan, 2005). This theoretical 
ambiguity is reflected in the instability of the ∆Unemployment coefficient across different estimation 
methods.   
VII. Further Considerations 
7.1.  Industry grouping 
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One could argue that actions of companies and their stock returns may be dependent on industry 
grouping. For this reason, we proceed to verify whether the relationship between changes in 
shareholders’ wealth and psychopathic traits remains significant, even after accounting for the influence 
of industry sector. To this end, we create nine dummy variables reflecting the Standard Industry 
Classification codes of the sample companies. The nine industries captured by the dummies are: 
agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, TCEGS (Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary Services), wholesale, retail, real estate & insurance, and services. In order to avoid 
perfect multicollinearity, we exclude Public Administration, which acts as a benchmark in our 
regression. Results from the pooled OLS regressions controlling for industry classification (not 
tabulated) reveal that four out of five psychopathic measures prove to be statistically significant 
predictors of returns and that none of the industry indicators attains statistical significance. 
7.2. Other measures of company performance 
Stock returns have been the only gauge of corporate performance examined thus far. Although 
this gauge is undoubtedly the most important from the shareholders’ viewpoint, other performance 
indicators may also warrant investigation. For instance, one suitable measure which has been used as a 
control in our study is Earnings_Growth. It is defined as an increase in earnings per share scaled by the 
stock price. This variable is employed here to investigate whether there is a link between psychopathic-
like behavior of corporations and their future fundamentals. More specifically, we examine the 
relationship between the current level of psychopathy proxies and the next year’s Earnings_Growth in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table VI. With the exception of FRC_Action, all of the psychopathy variables 
are negatively signed in both the pooled OLS and the fixed effect specifications. 
Psychopathic_Language, Audit_Problems and Idiosyncratic_Risk are statistically significant in at least 
one of the two models.  
[Table VI about here] 
We further probe the nexus between the presence of managerial psychopathy and corporate 
profitability by collecting data on the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). In order 
to eliminate any estimation problems arising from the persistence of these two measures, we express 
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them in a first differenced form. The predictive regressions (3) to (6) in Table VI show that the same 
three psychopathic proxies influencing earnings dynamics adversely and significantly affect our 
profitability metrics. Taken together, these results indicate that losses in shareholder wealth attributable 
to the presence of psychopaths are not simply confined to reputational damage. Suppression of earnings 
growth and profitability appear to be other dire consequences, which seem to translate into lower stock 
market valuations. Such findings are consistent with the corporate psychopathy theory (Boddy, 
2017) postulating that psychopaths are present amongst high ranking executives in organizations and 
that their leadership leads to underperformance and inefficient economic outcomes.  
The final performance gauge we examine is Tobin’s q (Tobin and Brainard, 1977), defined as 
the ratio of company’s market value to its book value. Models (7) and (8) in Table VI link future changes 
in Tobin’s q to the current level of psychopathic traits and a range of control variables. Regardless of 
the econometric approach adopted, Audit_Problems and Idiosyncratic_Risk prove to be statistically 
significant predictors, which are negatively signed. This inverse relationship may reflect the damaging 
effect that psychopaths have on the intellectual capital of companies, such as reputation, human and 
relational capital, or some other intangible assets. These items may not be fully reflected on the balance 
sheet, because IAS 38 (Accounting for Intangible Assets) stipulates that an intangible asset cannot be 
recorded unless its fair value is known. Since corporate psychopaths may undermine the value of 
unrecorded intangibles, they will affect the market valuation more than the book value, leading to 
changes in Tobin’s q.  
7.3. Another proxy for psychopathy 
Previous empirical research by Boddy et al. (2010) and Ray and Jones (2011) documented that 
individuals with psychopathic personality disorder tend to disregard corporate social responsibility 
concerns. While such disregard at an organizational level may be symptomatic of psychopathic 
leadership, the question remains whether financial markets penalize this type of managerial attitude. To 
explore this issue in greater depth, we have collected data on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) scores from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. For each company, the ESG score is derived 
by aggregating 178 relevant measures compiled by Thomson Reuters analysts and computing a 
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percentile rank score (i.e. percentage of companies with a worse corporate social responsibility 
performance). Our study also utilizes the ESG Combined indicator, which discounts the original ESG 
scores whenever news controversies arise.  
The abovementioned scores, however, pertain to a particular calendar year, which is 
problematic in the context of our study. The reference date used for the calculation of all of the 
remaining variables is the date on which the annual report was published. This creates a timing 
mismatch and implies that the ESG scores cannot be added into our regressions. In order to circumvent 
the problem, we construct a new variable labeled Returns_cy which represents company’s stock return 
in a given calendar year. In order to assure variable stationarity, we compute percentage changes in the 
scores, creating thereby pcESG and pcESG_Combined variables. Panel A in Table VII reports 
regression estimates for models linking the value of pcESG and pcESG_Combined indicators to the 
stock returns in the subsequent calendar year (Returns_cy(t+1)). The relationship is clearly positive and 
statistically significant. Consequently, the negligence of corporate social responsibility that 
characterizes companies with psychopathic leadership can be viewed as a forewarning of future 
shareholder losses. We would like to point out, however, that CRS activities are only one of the possible 
outcomes of “non-psychopathy”, which can also foster better customer relations and employee 
satisfaction.     
[Table VII about here] 
7.4. Employee turnover 
Boddy and Croft (2016) as well as Boddy (2017) provide evidence that employees reporting to 
a psychopath lose enthusiasm for their jobs and leave the company within a relatively short period. 
Regrettably, UK companies are not mandated by law to disclose staff turnover statistics, which makes 
the precise estimation of this effect relatively difficult. One piece of information that is useful in this 
regard, however, is the composition of the board of directors which is published in annual reports. By 
collecting data from these reports, we have created a variable called New_Members measuring the 
number of new directors on the board in a given firm-year. The newcomers would usually join the 
company in order to replace their departed predecessors. In what follows, we use this variable as a crude 
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proxy for staff turnover. This proxy has admittedly its own shortcomings, as relative to directors, junior 
employees can be more adversely affected by the presence of the psychopath in the higher echelons of 
corporate structure. Nevertheless, since data on rotation of lower ranked staff members is not available, 
we resort to using the abovementioned measure to draw our inferences.  
The estimations we have performed reveal that the New_Members variable is positively and 
statistically significantly correlated with Psychopathic_Language (ρ = 0.0641, p-value = 0.0163) and 
Idiosyncratic_Risk (ρ = 0.0557, p-value = 0.0371). The Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
remaining corporate psychopathy proxies are statistically indistinguishable from zero, although that for 
FRC_Action borders on statistical significance (ρ = 0.0424, p-value = 0.1124). Taken together, these 
results are in line with the observations made in case studies of Boddy and Croft (2016) and Boddy 
(2017) that individuals working under psychopathic management are more likely to explore alternative 
employment opportunities. 
7.5. Psychopathic proxies and board of directors turnover 
Since there are no successful medical therapies at present, psychopathy can be considered a 
permanent feature of personality. One may therefore argue that the effect of psychopathic management 
should be picked up fully by time-invariant company dummies in the fixed effect panel return 
regressions. This, however, proved not to be the case and psychopathic proxies retained their statistical 
significance in the panel specification. The reason why time dimension matters is related to rotation of 
corporate leadership. To illustrate this point, we collected data on CEO turnover from annual reports 
and we created a dummy variable called CEO_Change. When a corporate leader is being replaced, there 
is a possibility that a psychopath is either leaving or joining the company. In the former case we would 
expect all of the psychopathy proxies to fall in agreement. In the case of the latter, the psychopathic 
variables would be expected to increase simultaneously. To capture this unison of movement, we create 
the following variable: 
Psychopathy_Absolute_Change = Number of increasing psychopathy proxies – Number of 
decreasing psychopathy proxies  [5] 
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 Since the number of psychopathy proxies considered is five, the maximum value of 
Psychopathy_Absolute_Change is also five and it materializes whenever all of the proxies either fall or 
rise at the same time. If there is no alteration in the psychological characteristics of the CEO, the 
Psychopathy_Absolute_Change would be expected to take values closer to its minimum of zero.  
In what follows, we examine whether CEO replacements alter the expression of corporate 
psychopathy. To accomplish this task, we link Psychopathy_Absolute_Change to CEO_Change using 
a pooled OLS regression. Our findings, which are displayed in Panel B of Table VII, show that 
psychopathy measures change more consistently following a rotation on the top of corporate hierarchy. 
We would like to note in passing that, when we focus on the board turnover rather than CEO departures, 
similar conclusions are reached. 
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The findings presented in this paper lend credence to the upper echelons perspective put forward 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984), which argues that managerial characteristics predict organizational 
outcomes. More specifically, our empirical analysis supported the hypothesis that psychopathic-like 
tendencies exhibited by top management teams are particularly destructive from the point of view of 
shareholder wealth. There are potentially two complementary rationalizations for the observed 
phenomenon. Firstly, psychopaths who are devoid of compassion and have a natural propensity to lie 
pose a reputational risk to companies. We documented that reservations expressed by auditors, as well 
as negligence of corporate social responsibility and philanthropic giving can be detrimental to stock 
market valuations. Secondly, the presence of psychopaths can negatively impact on the fundamentals 
of companies, as employee morale plunges, chaos is created, and unnecessary risks are taken. The 
uncertainties are exacerbated further by the departures of board members who refuse to work in a 
psychopathic environment. Earnings and profitability ratios of the affected companies have been shown 
to grow at lower rates, which further justifies the negative stock market reaction.  
In their paper, Hambrick and Mason (1984) maintained that investigations into the upper 
echelons perspective can potentially deliver three major benefits. They can inform the selection process 
of directors and executives, offer a framework to predict organizational outcomes and foresee the 
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actions of competitors. Starting with the human resources implications of our study, it is clear that 
companies should try their utmost to identify psychopathic behavior amongst their current and potential 
employees. From the recruitment stage, all the information provided by the strongest candidates should 
be carefully verified. In the UK, employers can request criminal record checks through the 
governmental Disclosure and Barring Service. Whether the job candidate has indeed received a degree 
and grade claimed can be ascertained via the official Higher Education Degree Datacheck. Opinions of 
past employers should be sought, after verifying their contact details. This is important, as pathological 
liars often give telephone numbers of their friends, claiming that these are the contact details of their 
past supervisors. While these tasks may sound onerous, they can easily be outsourced to companies that 
specialize in performing background checks. Secondly, firms should institute appropriate internal 
controls and procedures, which make it difficult for employees to abuse their power, engage in anti-
social behavior or cause injury to others and the firm’s reputation. Anonymous complaint procedures 
should be put in place, in order to protect whistle-blowers against vindictive psychopaths. Thirdly, a 
psychological evaluation of individuals being considered for positions of great responsibility should be 
performed. Tools such as B-Scan 360 could be successfully used for this purpose.   
 In terms of predicting organizational outcomes, we have demonstrated that our psychopathy 
proxies correlate with future stock returns, changes in profitability ratios, Tobin’s q, earnings growth as 
well as director trunover. Although the nature of return predictability constitutes a valuable insight from 
the investors’ perspective, it is somewhat puzzling on theoretical grounds. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis put forward by Fama (1970) states that investors cannot beat the market on a risk-adjusted 
basis and that stock prices should follow an unpredictable random walk. The results presented here offer 
evidence to the contrary. We are able to predict significant falls in stock prices of companies which are 
deemed likely to have psychopaths in their echelons of power. If diligent market participants conduct 
the necessary research to identify these companies, they will be able to enjoy superior investment 
performance, simply by eliminating these inferior stocks from their portfolios.  
 The third benefit of empirical studies on the upper echelon theory, that Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) alluded to, is the potential ability to foretell moves of competitors within the industry. 
Companies considering a takeover or merger could assess the target using the psychopathy variables 
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proposed in our paper. If the values of those proxies are high relative to other companies operating in 
the market, this will have serious implications for retention of the target’s directors and the amount of 
due diligence required. Further insights are also available to competitors of companies with 
psychopathic traits. Our results indicate that charitable giving and corporate social responsibility 
undertakings are powerful tools for building brands and enhancing reputation.  
While our study suggests which variables could be useful in the identification procedure, it is 
merely one of the first steps in the literature. Future research could focus on a broader spectrum of 
indicators, which we were unable to construct in the UK context due to data unavailability. For instance, 
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Returns Continuously compounded stock return in a 250‐trading day window which starts one day after the annual report 
publication date. 
Psychopatic_Language A measure derived from automated content analysis of annual report narratives. It increases in the frequency of words 
representing self‐reference, aggression and blame and decreases with the usage of terms related to human interest. 
The exact formula used in the construction of this variable is given in equation [2].  
Audit_Problems A dummy variable taking a value of 1 whenever the auditors indicated issues within the Emphasis of Matter section of 
the annual report and 0 otherwise.   
FRC_Action A dummy variable taking a value of 1 whenever the Financial Reporting Council launched a formal action against the 
company and 0 otherwise. 
Idiosyncratic_Risk Standard deviation of CAPM regression residuals. The CAPM regression is specified in our equation [3]. 
Lack_of_Empathy This variable is constructed as –(charitable donations/market capitalization of the firm). 
Beta Beta of a company estimated by regressing company’s returns on FTSE 350 returns during a 200‐trading day window 
(‐201, ‐2), relative to the annual report publication date (Day 0).  
Size Natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year for which the annual report is 
published. 
Book_to_Market Book value per share divided by share price at the end of fiscal year to which the annual report refers. 
Earnings_Growth Change in earnings per share relative to the previous year scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal year for 
which the reporting is done.  
Sales_Increase An annual percentage change in total revenue. 
∆Leverage Change in financial leverage defined as (total liabilities/total assets). 
IP_Growth Industrial production growth relative to previous period. 
Inflation Growth rate in the Consumer Price Index relative to previous period. 







 No. obs. Mean Standard Deviation 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Returns 1262 0.0303 0.4293 ‐0.1649 0.0794 0.2673 
Psychopatic_Language 1262 0.0000 1.9469 ‐1.1162 ‐0.3326 0.6181 
Audit_Problems 1262 0.0119 0.1084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FRC_Action 1262 0.0024 0.0487 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic_Risk 1259 0.0189 0.0091 0.0128 0.0165 0.0223 
Lack_of_Empathy 1255 ‐0.0005 0.0015 0.0000 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0004 
Beta 1262 0.9053 0.4040 0.6423 0.8625 1.1278 
Size 1257 14.2887 1.4543 13.3070 14.0363 15.0170 
Book_to_Market 1257 0.5932 0.7756 0.2316 0.3975 0.7531 
Earnings_Growth 1254 ‐0.0187 0.4641 ‐0.0114 0.0079 0.0263 
Sales_Increase 1238 0.0878 0.2610 0.0075 0.0800 0.1660 
∆Leverage 1254 ‐0.0051 0.1015 ‐0.0420 ‐0.0046 0.0289 
IP_Growth 1262 ‐0.0011 0.0103 ‐0.0096 ‐0.0019 0.0050 
Inflation 1262 0.0033 0.0032 0.0020 0.0030 0.0060 
∆Unemployment 1262 0.0002 0.0012 ‐0.0010 0.0000 0.0010 






















Increase ∆Leverage IP_Growth Inflation 
Returns 1.0000              
Psychopatic_Language ‐0.0796*** 1.0000             
Audit_Problems ‐0.0659** 0.1033*** 1.0000            
FRC_Action ‐0.0197 ‐0.0334 ‐0.0047 1.0000           
Idiosyncratic_Risk ‐0.0589** 0.0337 0.1160*** 0.0566** 1.0000          
Lack_of_Empathy ‐0.0915*** ‐0.0209 0.0178 0.0003 ‐0.0058 1.0000         
Beta ‐0.0232 ‐0.0410 0.0551* ‐0.0640** 0.1398*** ‐0.0300 1.0000        
Size ‐0.1239*** 0.0411 0.0127 0.0510* ‐0.1121*** ‐0.2121*** 0.1002*** 1.0000       
Book_to_Market 0.1296*** ‐0.0068 0.0810*** ‐0.0121 0.0209 ‐0.0197 0.0897*** ‐0.1645*** 1.0000      
Earnings_Growth ‐0.1058*** ‐0.0169 ‐0.0180 0.0084 ‐0.0332 0.0106 ‐0.0232 0.0923*** ‐0.4589*** 1.0000     
Sales_Increase 0.0163 ‐0.0507* 0.0331 0.0172 ‐0.0049 ‐0.0259 0.0199 0.0284 ‐0.0310 0.0445 1.0000    
∆Leverage 0.0608** 0.0321 ‐0.0556* ‐0.0195 0.0802*** ‐0.0508* ‐0.0050 ‐0.0339 0.0451 ‐0.1538*** ‐0.0496* 1.0000   
IP_Growth 0.0466 ‐0.0350 0.0258 ‐0.0122 0.0243 ‐0.0252 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0511* 0.0158 0.0501* ‐0.0269 ‐0.0525 1.0000  
Inflation ‐0.2175*** 0.0378 ‐0.0207 0.0000 ‐0.0478* ‐0.0121 0.0450 0.0573** ‐0.0709** 0.0840*** 0.0249 ‐0.0423 0.2311*** 1.0000 
∆Unemployment 0.2164*** 0.0262 ‐0.0287 ‐0.0075 0.0095 ‐0.0651** ‐0.0407 ‐0.0937*** 0.1747*** ‐0.1488*** 0.0813*** 0.1391*** ‐0.0544* ‐0.2051*** 
Note: For exact definitions of the variables see Table I. Correlations were computed based on a sample of 1233 observations for which information on all variables was available. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 





Return Regressions – Pooled OLS 















































































IP_Growth    3.9861*** 
(1.1450) 
Inflation    ‐26.6123*** 
(3.7566) 
∆Unemployment    ‐51.2733*** 
(10.0426) 
No. obs. 1252 1252 1233 1233 
R-squared 2.1094% 5.5220% 6.0294% 12.8529% 
F-statistic 5.3700 9.0813 7.1220 12.8312 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table presents pooled OLS regressions in which 250‐trading day return following annual report publication date is taken 
to be a dependent variable. For definitions of explanatory variables please refer to Table I. The F‐statistic is for the null that 





Return Regressions – Fixed Effect Panels 





























































IP_Growth   2.1506* 
(1.1471) 
Inflation   ‐31.7637*** 
(4.3245) 
∆Unemployment   11.9177 
(10.0569) 
No. obs. 1252 1233 1233 
R-squared 31.4183% 32.1940% 36.0028% 
F-statistic 2.1951 2.2085 2.5736 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test (χ2 -  statistic) 279.7472 284.9275 254.9335 
Prob (χ2 -  statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table presents fixed effect panel regressions in which the dependent variable is defined as the 250‐
trading day return following annual report publication date. For definitions of explanatory variables please refer to 
Table I. Regressions (2*)‐(4*) are equivalents of regressions (2)‐(4) in Table IV, estimated using a different 
econometric method. The F‐statistic is for the null that regressors are jointly insignificant. The null hypothesis for 
the Hausman (1978) test is that the random effects are orthogonal to the regressors. To conserve space, we do not 

















 Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Panel Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Panel Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Panel Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Panel 










































































































































































































































R-squared 8.0552% 23.2251% 7.4784% 17.2337% 1.7442% 2.6455% 6.2404% 10.3058% 
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Note: This table presents pooled OLS and fixed effect panel regressions linking future changes in performance indicators to psychopathy proxies and other controls. The performance indicators used here include: 
next year’s Earnings_Growth, future change in Tobin’s q (defined as market‐to‐book ratio) and changes in return on assets and return on equity at time t+1.  Table I provides the definitions of the explanatory 
variables. All of the presented regressions are based on 1172 observations. Psychopathy proxies significant at the conventional significance levels are indicated using bold font. To conserve space, we do not 




Corporate Governance and CEO Changes 
Panel A. Regressions Linking Future Returns to Changes in Corporate Governance  
Dependent Variable: Returns_cy(t+1) 








pcESG_Combined  0.0995** 
(0.0449) 
No. obs. 937 937 
R-squared 0.4343% 0.5224% 
F-statistic 4.0786 4.9100 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0437 0.0269 
Panel B. Strength of Psychopathic Proxies Changes and Board of Directors Turnover 
Dependent Variable: Psychopathy_Absolute_Change 







No. obs. 1193  
R-squared 0.2636%  
F-statistic 3.1482  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0763  
Note: The regressions reported in Panel A model the association between stock returns in a given calendar year (Returns_cy) 
and the percentage changes in the environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores in the previous calendar year. pcESG 
denotes the percentage growth in Thomson Reuters ESG scores for a particular company, while pcESG_Combined adjusts 
these scores for ESG controversies. The dependent variable in the regressions shown in Panel B is 
Psychopathy_Absolute_Change measuring whether the five main psychopathy proxies defined in the paper increase or 
decrease in unison. More specifically, it is defined the absolute value of the difference between the number of proxies that 
experienced an increase and the number of proxies experiencing a fall. The explanatory variable CEO_Change is a dummy 
taking the value of 1 whenever the chief executive officer is replaced and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
